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IV. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) by transfer from the Utah Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(k). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Kurzets adequately identify the issues on appeal and the applicable standards of 
review, with one exception: with respect to the standard of review applicable to the trial court's 
decision not to impose Rule 11 sanctions against Bailey-Allen, the Kurzets' Brief properly 
identifies the "correctness" standard of review for legal conclusions and the "abuse of discretion" 
standard for the amount and type of sanction. In addition, the "clearly erroneous" standard 
governs the trial court's factual findings underlying its decision regarding sanctions. Barnard v. 
Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of which is attached hereto in 
Addendum 3. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Facts in the record which clarify, correct or complete the "Relevant Facts" presented by 
Kurzet include the following: 
1. When Bailey-Allen entered into its agreement with the Kurzets, the Kurzets' home 
had only a foundation and a basement slab, with underslab plumbing and heating. There had 
been no back filling and no framing. (R. 331). 
2. The Kurzets were generally happy with the progress of construction of the home 
during the time Bailey-Allen was on the job. (R. 608-611). 
3. During the three months of work by Bailey-Allen, Bailey-Allen provided many 
general contractor services, including the following: 
a. Generally coordinated work on the job (R. 752-53); 
b. Helped arrange for a framing subcontractor (R. 339-40); 
c. Arranged for and supervised excavation and back filling (R. 339-40); 
d. Assisted in arranging for masonry subcontractors (R. 339-40); 
e. Arranged for preliminary plumbing work (R. 339-40) (R. 116); 
f. Arranged for a concrete cutter (R. 116); 
g. Arranged for a concrete subcontractor (R. 116); 
h. Arranged for a steel contractor (R. 116) (R. 339-40, 427); 
i. Arranged for site organization and site clean up (R. 339-40); 
j . Arranged for inspections by the City (R. 752-53); 
k. Met occasionally with the architect and with the engineer (R. 430-31); 
1. Ordered materials for the project and arranged for a crane to be on site (R. 
432-34); and 
m. Placed orders for windows and one order for lumber (R. 443). 
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4. At the time of Bailey-Allen's termination as general contractor, the home was 
framed and the roof was partially completed. I i we work under contact was 10% 
complete. (R. 215). 
VIII. 
The trial court carefully followed this Court's instruction on remand. The trial court 
considered the evidence regarding each issue upon which this Court found the original Findings 
of Fact i' ; | '.."• ' - !. 'iv1 *ht* ^-;1 i\; the 
trial court entered detailed, consistent findings on each of those issues. 
In its unique position as fact finder', ob;-<r\ ing L;IL - • .*._
 J v*:sonall> and assessing 
their credibility, the trial court properly afforded more weight to some evidence than other 
evidence. But with respect to each Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, the court relied upon 
substantial e\ iclei ice in tl le i e : ird. 
The trial court also properly discharged its duties with respect to the Kurzets' Motions for 
Sanctions and for judgment Nunc r:. nine. 
IX. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE riUALCULki LUMl'LlbD Willi IHis iUURi 'S REMAND 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
This Court remanded: 
For analysis and findings undei the standard articulated in Davies. 
The trial court should make detailed, consistent findings on each of 
the three required elements and allow recover}7 only if all three are 
satisfied. 
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Bailey-Allen v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994). (R. 812). On remand, the Court 
provided detail and consistency on all three of the Davies elements. 
1. The Trial Court's Findings Were Detailed. 
The trial court made 23 separate detailed findings regarding: the nature and terms of the 
underlying contract (R. 1114); the precise nature of contractual breach as determined by the court 
(R. 1115); the exact value of each deficiency found in Bailey-Allen's work (R. 1116); the reasons 
for termination of the underlying contract (R. 1118); the number of hours worked per week (R. 
1116); the number of visits by Mr. Allen to the project (R. 1116); Mr. Allen's efforts to make 
himself available to Kurzet (R. 1116); the "considerable time" invested by Bailey-Allen in 
making calls, setting up appointments and contacting other contractors (R. 1117); other "general 
contractor services" provided by Bailey-Allen as listed in the court's findings (R. 1117); the stage 
of completion before Bailey-Allen's work (R. 1117); the stage of completion after Bailey-Allen's 
work (R. 1117); Mr. Kurzet's attention to the project; Mr. Kurzet's satisfaction with the project 
(R. 1117); and a step-by-step calculation of the court's monetary award (R. 1120-21). The trial 
court fully complied with this Court's request for detail. 
2. The Trial Court Made Detailed Findings As To Each Of The Three Davies 
Elements. 
The first element which Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987) requires in 
order to award a quantum meruit judgment is that "the defendant received a benefit." Davies at 
269 (R. 812). The trial court's findings carefully identify the benefit received by the Kurzets as 
follows: 
The court finds that during the time plaintiff was a general 
contractor of the project, the residence progressed from a concrete 
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slab to a point where the roof was ready to be completed on the 
multi-story residence. Based upon the testimony of defendant's 
expert witness, the court finds that ten percent of the construction 
project completed by the contract was completed during the time 
plaintiff was general contractor. (R. 1117), 
general contractor services. 
The court concludes that plaintiffs services as a general contractor 
conferred a benefit to the defendants." (R 1119) 
The court further detailed the general contractor services as follows: 
The court finds that during the three-month period that the contract 
as in effect, Michael Kent of the plaintiff was on the construct-in 
site approximately thirty (30) hours per week. In addition. N
 t 
Richard Allen of the plaintiff visited the construction site 
practically every day for some period of time, by his own 
testimony. 
The court finds that Mr. Allen was also available on his n 
phone when not on site and made or received daily calls 
concerning the job. 
The court finds that Mr. Allen also spent considerable time at his 
home in the evening making calls, setting up appointments and 
contracting with other contractors in connection with the job. 
The court finds that during the three-month period that the contract 
was in effect, plaintiff performed general contractor services, 
including the hiring of subcontractors, overseeing the work of 
subcontractors, getting bids on retaining walls, windows, cabinets 
and other items, meeting with people, including building inspectors 
and generally coordinating the work on the job. (R 1116, 1117). 
The court finds that defendants received a benefit of $5,500 
through plaintiffs settlement of the dispute over the amount owed 
on the prior lumber order. (R 1118). 
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The second Davies requirement is "an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the 
benefit." Davies at 269 (R. 812). The trial court's findings are also detailed on this point: 
The court finds that defendant Stanley Kurzet was regularly on the 
job site, often as much as six (6) hours a day. He personally 
observed the progress on the home. As a result, defendants were 
aware of the progress of the home while plaintiff was the general 
contractor and [were] aware of the benefit defendant received as a 
result of plaintiff s services. 
The court finds that at no time during the three-month period in 
which the contract was in effect did defendants express any 
dissatisfaction with the work or progress on the job. On at least 
one occasion, Stanley Kurzet expressed to plaintiff that he was 
satisfied with the way the work was going. Defendants did not 
attempt to stop plaintiff from completing the contract until 
defendant Stanley Kurzet terminated the same in connection with 
the insurance matter. 
The court finds that defendant Kurzet acknowledged at trial that 
plaintiff was the general contractor on the job during the time in 
which the work was completed which was the subject of plaintiff s 
complaint. (R. 1117-18). 
With respect to the benefit of $5,500 relating to lumber negotiations, the court found that 
"defendants were aware of plaintiff s involvement in such matter and were aware of the $5,500 
savings which they thereby received." (R. 1118). 
The third Davies requirement is that the circumstances "would make it unjust for the 
defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it." Davies at 269 (R. 812). Regarding this 
element, the trial court again made specific and separate findings. With respect to the general 
contractor services described above, the trial court concluded "that under the circumstances, it 
would be unjust for the defendants to retain the benefit received without payment for the same." 
(R. 1120). With respect to the benefit to the Kurzets relating to lumber costs, the trial court 
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concluded that "defendants were aware of plaintiff s actions with respect thereto and that it would 
be unjust to allow defendants to retain such benefits without payment of a reasonable fee to 
plaintiff for such benefit." (R. 1122). 
3. The Trial Court's Findings And Conclusions Are Consistent. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law "clarify" rather than "supersede" the original Findings 
and Conclusions. I he Kurzets" argument fails because clarification is whai w ,mn requested 
and because no inconsistencies remain. 
This Court remanded to the trial court because the trial court's prior findings needed 
* * > * ' n r { K i • •< n , . ' r l ^ 
trial court's findings because "the trial court seemed to agree, at least in theory ' vith the 
Kurzets (R. 812) (emphasis added). I he problem was that the facts did i lot "make clear" that a 
quasi contract! ia.1 award was appropriate. (R. 812) (emphasis added). This Court also observed 
that it was "equally unclear whether the second element of the Davies test was satisfied." (R. 
mistaken to insist that the trial court supersede its prior findings. The Appellate Court requested 
clarification and the trial court provided it. 
Moreover, clarification provides consistency. Because the Amended Findings and 
Conclusions clarify prior Findings and Conclusions, the court must interpret the original 
that the Amended Findings are inconsistent with the original Findings. For example, the Kurzets 
point out that the original Findings stated that Bailey-Allen spent very7 few hours on the job site 
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and did not give the construction project the attention it required. To the extent "very few hours" 
needed clarification, the Amended Findings provide it. The 30 hours per week and three months 
described in the Amended Findings are "very few" compared to the hours and months anticipated 
by the original contract. But they are sufficient to support the trial Court's judgment. 
The Kurzets also contend that inconsistency remains within the court's original finding 
that Bailey-Allen completed 10% of the construction, with a value of $10,000, "regardless of 
whether plaintiff performed its duties under the contract." (R. 216). Again, this is a simple 
matter of clarification. The original Finding did not specify whether it meant a complete failure 
to perform any duties or whether it meant that Bailey-Allen performed many of it duties and 
conferred many benefits "regardless of whether plaintiff performed [all of] its duties under the 
contract." The new Amended Findings clarify by concluding that Bailey-Allen's work as a 
general contractor conferred benefits to the Kurzets (R. 1119). This is not inconsistent with the 
prior Finding that Bailey-Allen failed to perform some of its duties under the contract. 
B. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS EACH OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The Appellate Court cannot reject the trial court's Amended Findings of Fact unless they 
are "clearly erroneous." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 934, 939 (Utah 1994). Where substantial 
evidence supports a finding of fact, that finding is not clearly erroneous. 
1. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 14. 
The Kurzets contend that Amended Finding of Fact No. 14 is not supported by the 
evidence. However, the Kurzets have failed to marshall the evidence. Fact No. 14 states that 
8 
Michael Kent spent 30 hours per week on the construction site and that Mr. Allen visited the 
construction site practically every day. Mr. Kent testified: 
Q: Give me, in terms of hours, per day that you would have 
been there. 
A: Average? 
Q: Yes. You would get there at what time? 
A: Most days I would get there around 9:00 leave around 4:00. 
Like I say, it was more as things were going on, other 
problems, we would be there earlier. Sometimes we were 
there — one time it was at 6:30 to meet a pump truck, and 
other times we would stay late at night. 
Q: Is it fair to say you were putting in 30 to 40 hour weeks? 
A: More than 30, yes. 
Q: Between 30 and 40 hours a week? 
A: Yeah, we weren't required to spend any time there. It was 
as-needed, nothing that says — . 
Q: I understand that. But you were spending 30 to 40 hours a 
week? 
A: At least 30 hours, more like 35 to 40. 
(R. 482-83). 
Of course, the Kurzets site Mr. Kurzet's testimony to the contrary. But this Court need 
not weigh the credibility of each witness. There was evidence to support the trial court's finding. 
The trial court simply believed the clear testimony of Mr. Kent. 
The Kurzets also argued that Finding of Fact No. 14 is unsupported because "there is 
apparently no other evidence that Mr. Allen visited the site every day." (Brief of Appellant at 23, 
9 
emphasis added.) But Finding of Fact No. 14 says that Mr. Allen visited the construction site 
"practically every day." This is supported by Mr. Allen's testimony that "some days I spent 10 
hours on the job, some days I would be there an hour or two." (R. 441). He admitted that he 
missed some days. (R. 441). But the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Mr. 
Allen visited the construction site "practically every day." 
2. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 15. 
The Kurzets next question Finding of Fact No. 15, which states that Mr. Allen was 
available on his mobile phone and made or received daily calls concerning the job. The Kurzets 
claim the finding is wrong because Mr. Allen said he received only two calls per week from 
people "on site." (R. 754). The Kurzets contend that the Findings of Fact are not supported by 
the evidence because "two calls per week is not 'daily.'" (Appellants' Brief at 25.) But the 
Finding by the court is not that Mr. Allen received calls daily from people on site. In addition to 
two calls from the site every week, there were also frequent calls regarding inspections and 
subcontractors. All of these calls qualify as "calls concerning the job" as summarized in the 
court's Findings. 
The record shows that Mr. Allen personally spent many hours on the telephone 
coordinating with subcontractors and talking with Mr. Kurzet. In fact, Mr. Kurzet himself 
provided the testimony regarding the "daily" conversations discussed above. 
Q: Would you get with Bailey-Allen alone on a day-to-day 
basis to discuss the construction progress? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 514). 
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Mr. Kent explained that many of these conversations were telephone calls between Mr. 
Kurzet and Mr. Allen. 
(Mr. Kent) 
Q: In addition to that, you spent other time at home at night on 
the telephone coordinating? 
A: Yes. 
Q: In an average day, how much time would that take? 
A: Probably an hour or two; however, Richard was always 
talking to Stan. I never really talked to him on the phone. 
Richard spent a lot of time on the phone. 
(R. 489-90). 
Within the above portions of testimony, there is ample evidence to support the court's 
conclusion that Mr. Allen had daily telephone calls regarding this project, whether receiving or 
sending and whether on-site or off-site. 
3. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 16. 
The Kurzets next question Amended Finding of Fact No. 16, which states that Mr. Allen 
spent "considerable time" at his home in the evening making calls and setting up appointments 
related to this contract. The Kurzets' only marshall evidence that Mr. Kent, rather than Mr. 
Allen, spent many hours in the evening coordinating subcontractors that could not be reached 
during the daytime. The Kurzets argue that Mr. Kent's time does not justify any award based 
upon general contractor services because Mr. Kent is not a general contractor. (Appellants' Brief 
at 27). Of course, general contractors are not required to make all telephone calls personally in 
order to be compensated. As an authorized agent of Mr. Allen, Mr. Kent can coordinate 
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schedules with subcontractors and perform, on Mr. Allen's behalf, some of the functions of a 
general contractor. 
The record also shows that Mr. Allen personally spent "considerable time" on the 
telephone coordinating with subcontractors and talking with Mr. Kurzet. As quoted above, Mr. 
Kurzet himself testified about "daily" conversations with Mr. Allen. (R. 514). Mr. Kent 
explained that many of these conversations were telephone calls between Mr. Kurzet and Mr. 
Allen. (R. 489-90). 
The Kurzets argue that the evidence shows that Mr. Allen was "seldom there" or "very 
seldom there" (Appellants' Brief at 23). Of course, the trial court did not have to believe Mr. 
Kurzet. More importantly, regardless of whether Mr. Allen was "there", the evidence indicates 
that he helped coordinate and supervise masonry (R. 429-30), framing (R. 431, 432, 433), steel 
erection, excavation, compaction, back filling, concrete cutting and plumbing (R. 423, 427). 
Accordingly, there is more than enough evidence to support Finding No. 16. 
4. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 17. 
The Kurzets next question Amended Fact No. 17, regarding the general scope of general 
contractor services provided by Bailey-Allen. The Kurzets admit that Mr. Allen arranged for an 
excavator, concrete cutter, a concrete subcontractor, a plumber and a steel contractor. (R. 116, 
(Appellants' Brief at 29). The Kurzets also admit that there is evidence to support the finding 
that Mr. Allen met with people and generally coordinated the work on the job (Appellants' Brief 
at 31, R. 752-53, R. 430-431) and that Mr. Allen placed orders and worked on obtaining bids. (R. 
432-34, R. 443, Appellants' Brief at 32). Mr. Allen testified: 
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(R. 339-40). 
A: We arranged-along with Stan Kurzet—to get a framing 
subcontractor started. We arranged for an supervised 
excavation and backfilling. We talked with Stan Kurzet 
and arranged, with his approval, the masonry 
subcontractors to start on the fire places and masonry. 
We had a plumber do some preliminary work. We worked 
with the steel erectors, had them complete the erection of 
the steel framework. We arranged for site organization, site 
cleanup, talked with him on getting an electrical 
subcontractor, and had many discussions about that. 
Q: Did you have anything to do with ordering of materials or 
supplies during the time you were on the project? 
A: Yes, when we got there, there was a substantial amount of 
material on the site that was left there from the previous 
builder. 
We counted that up for him, and gave him a price we 
thought would be the worth for that to settle with the old 
contractor. 
A: We did extensive cleanup and keeping the job organized. 
We coordinated extensive concrete cutting. We 
coordinated with the steel erectors, the erection of the steel 
girders. 
We did the coordination with the excavators, the bidding 
out of the retaining wall work to go in back of the building. 
We—I don't know if they mentioned our involvement with 
getting the window bids; we did that. We were in the 
process of getting cabinet bids and roofing the prices, 
anything we were asked to do we were doing it. 
Q: Did you also coordinate with the City to arrange for 
necessary inspections on the site? 
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A: Yes, there were numerous inspections that were scheduled 
and coordinated with the masonry and framing subcontractors. 
(R. 752-53). 
Again, there is more than enough evidence to support the trial court's finding. 
5. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 19. 
Finding No. 19 concludes that the Kurzets were aware that they were receiving benefits 
from Bailey-Allen. The Kurzets dispute Finding of Fact No. 19, to the extent that it suggests that 
the progress on the home was due to Bailey-Allen's efforts. (Appellants' Brief at 34-35). The 
portions of evidence, quoted above, more than support a finding that Bailey-Allen's services 
contributed to the benefits received by the Kurzets. Whether or not Bailey-Allen's work 
contributed to the progress in the construction was a fact issue. Obviously, a homeowner who 
stands in the midst of the construction and watches it go from foundation to roofing is aware that 
he is receiving a benefit. Moreover, the record includes evidence that the Kurzets had no general 
complaint about the general progress of Bailey-Allen's services (R. 466-67). 
6. Substantial Evidence Supports Finding No. 20. 
Finally, the Kurzets criticize Finding of Fact No. 20, which states that the Kurzets failed 
to express any dissatisfaction with the work or progress on the job. This finding is supported by 
the evidence with respect to the general work or progress on the project. Mr. Kent testified: 
Q: Did Mr. Kurzet ever express dissatisfaction generally with 
the way things were being handled prior to October 2nd? 
A: Not generally. 
Q: Did he ever express concerns about an item or two that may 
be wasn't going the way he wanted it to? 
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A: Oh, yes. 
(R. 466-67). Mr. Kurzet kept a log concerning the progress of the construction. The log 
included substantial evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Kurzet was satisfied 
with the progress on his home. Mr. Kurzet testified: 
Q: Your entry on August 2nd states: "Good progress on 
framing". Is that correct? 
A: Yes. 
*** *** *** 
Q: Things were going well, were they not, at that point on the 
construction site? 
A: Yes. 
Q: The next entry on August 3rd, you indicate that "things 
continue to go well. Plumber showed as promised." Is that 
what you say, generally? 
A: It was rather unusual for a plumber to show up as promised. 
Q: The point I am making is, as you indicate, things are 
continuing to go well as of August 3rd, are they not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: On August 8th, page number 8, your entry states, "things 
going well." Does it not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Turn to page 11, down at the bottom, August 20, you start 
your entry with "the site is substantially cleaned up;" do 
you not, Mr. Kurzet? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: Rather than reading them, let me make three more 
comments. If you disagree with me, you can, but in the 
interest of time, on August 31 you indicated, "main level 
walls going up rapidly and the mason is back making 
progress." 
Then a few weeks later, on September 20, you said, "walls 
going up like fury." . . . Mr. Kurzet, there is a note that you 
are going out of town on the 26th of September and you 
make an entry that you went to California and "had a warm 
feeling that things are going okay." Did you say that on the 
26th of September, in your log? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you were out of town, were you not, until late on 
October 1st, according to your entry on September 26; were 
you not? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the next morning, despite your warm, fuzzy feelings, 
you get on the site and fire these guys, don't you? 
A: Yes. 
(R. 608-611). 
The important thing to consider is that the trial court's judgment and award would be 
equally sustainable on appeal if the finding of fact had read that the Kurzets failed to express any 
dissatisfaction with the work or progress "generally." That statement is supported by the 
evidence in the record and, in turn, supports the trial court's judgment. 
The Kurzets' appeal is nothing more than a disagreement with the court's conclusions as a 
fact finder. The evidence was before the trial court, and it was the trial court's duty to judge the 
credibility of that evidence. The trial court was under no duty or obligation to believe any of the 
testimony from Mr. Kurzet or any other witness which the trial court found to lack credibility. 
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For each of the trial court's conclusions of fact, there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support that conclusion. It matters not whether there would have been other evidence to support 
a different conclusion. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED QUANTUM MERUIT 
COMPENSATION FOR BENEFITS TO THE KURZETS RESULTING FROM 
BAILEY-ALLEN'S LUMBER NEGOTIATIONS. 
The trial court properly responded to this Court's instruction to "make certain that any 
benefit conferred in negotiating the price of the lumber must be somehow in addition to the 
benefits Bailey-Allen conferred by virtue of performing its contractual duty to supervise the 
project." (R. 812). The trial court concluded that "negotiation of the disputed lumber bill left 
over from prior contractor was not within the scope of the contract." (R. 1121). 
The Kurzets illogically suggest that negotiations regarding the disputed prior lumber bill 
were anticipated in the original contract because Mr. Allen "included that task in his description 
of services that he supposedly provided as a general contractor." (Appellants' Brief at 40-41). 
The fact that Mr. Allen said he performed these services and that he did them as a general 
contractor, means absolutely nothing about whether he anticipated doing them when he 
originally negotiated the contract. The trial court's reasoning makes more sense. A general 
contractor would not expect to re-negotiate the price of lumber which has already been ordered 
and delivered through the prior general contractor. 
The Kurzets do not deny that the record establishes Bailey-Allen's status as a licensed 
general contractor and that Bailey-Allen has experience in negotiating lumber prices. The record 
clearly suggests that such experience was employed and that a benefit of $5,500 resulted. The 
court's decision to award Bailey-Allen fifty percent (50%) of that benefit is not arbitrary. The 
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court heard the testimony about Bailey-Allen's work in re-negotiating the lumber price and 
concluded that $2,750 was fair. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE KURZETS' MOTION FOR ENTRY 
OF JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC 
The Kurzets argue that the trial court should have awarded a judgment in their favor 
against Bailey-Allen, based upon construction defects, rather than offsetting those values against 
Bailey-Allen's judgment. As a practical matter, the Kurzets' argument is meaningless. The 
Kurzets did not file a supersedeas bond when they noticed this appeal. Therefore, Bailey-Allen 
possesses a collectible judgment against the Kurzets. Bailey-Allen is, therefore, entitled to retain 
the amount which the trial court applied as an offset. As stated in the Kurzets' Appellant Brief, a 
judgment is final until it is reversed on appeal, modified or set aside by the court that rendered it. 
(Appellants' Brief at 43). Based upon the judgment below, Bailey-Allen is entitled to retain the 
offset amount. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE KURZETS' MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS. 
Before trial, the lower court dismissed Bailey-Allen's mechanic's lien cause of action 
because the claimed lien amount was allegedly too high. Upon remand to the district court, 
Bailey-Allen moved the district court to reinstate Bailey-Allen's original mechanic's lien claim. 
The Kurzets responded by asking for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, based upon its position that the trial court lacked the power to reform a partial 
summary judgment from which Bailey-Allen did not appeal. The trial court denied the Kurzets' 
Motion for Sanctions. The Kurzets now contend that it was error not to award sanctions. The 
Kurzets' argument fails because case law supported Bailey-Allen's position that the trial court 
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could reform its previous judgment and case law supported Bailey-Allen's position regarding the 
mechanic's Lien. 
1. Case Law Supports Bailev-Allen's Position That the Trial Court Could Reform, 
after Appeal, a Judgment Which Had Not Been Raised in the First Appeal. 
Contrary to the Kurzets' allegations, Utah law does support the position Bailey-Allen 
took when it moved the District Court to reinstate the original mechanic's lien. Under Utah law, 
the trial court had the power to reform its pre-appeal partial summary judgment. In Board of 
Education of Granite School District v. Cox, 395 P.2d 55 (Utah 1964), the plaintiff sued 
defendants Rex and Wilmina Cox for specific performance based upon a real estate agreement 
which had only been signed by Rex. The trial court entered a default judgment, requiring 
transfer of the property in exchange for $42,000. The court later granted Wilmina's motion to set 
aside the default, and denied Rex's similar motion. Rex appealed the trial court's decision not to 
set aside the default. No one appealed the amount entered by the trial court. After the Supreme 
Court affirmed, the plaintiff sought an order directing Rex to transfer his interest in the property 
for $21,000. Rex contended that the affirmed judgment was the law of the case, and could not be 
reformed by the trial judge. The trial judge reformed its earlier judgment, and ordered Rex to 
convey his interest for $21,000. On the second appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
The question now, however, is whether the lower court had the 
power to reform the judgment against Rex after the same had been 
affirmed by this court. Under the particular facts of this case, we 
are of the opinion that it did. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in 
furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment... 
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Applying the foregoing Rule to the case at hand, the lower court 
was right in relieving plaintiff from the $42,000 judgment. . . 
Cox at 56. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the trial court's power to reform its judgment. It did 
so in spite of the dissent's concern that the original judgment has persisted without complaint or 
motion by the plaintiff before, during, or for a considerable time after the Supreme Court's 
decision. Id 
Other authorities also support the position taken by Bailey-Allen before the trial court. 
Wright and Miller quote the "classic statement" of Justice Holmes that "the law of the case 
doctrine 'merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been 
decided, not a limit to their power.'" Wright and Miller Federal Practice and Procedure: § 4478. 
(emphasis added.) 
Moore's Federal Practice Second Edition, paragraph 0.404[10] provides 
In the case of a remand for further proceedings, the mandate 
constitutes the law of the case only on such issues of law as were 
actually considered and decided by the appellate court, or 
necessarily to be inferred from the disposition on appeal. 
In the case of bar, this Court in the original appeal did not address the merits of the partial 
summary judgment with respect to the mechanic's lien. Accordingly, it remained within the trial 
court's power to reform its own judgment. See also, Hutchins v. State, 603 P.2d 995 (Idaho 
1979). 
Bailey-Allen voluntarily withdrew its motion to reinstate the mechanic's lien. But 
Bailey-Allen could have pursued its motion in good faith and on the basis of existing law. 
Therefore, Bailey-Allen did not violate Rule 11. 
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2. Case Law Also Supported Bailev-Allen's Position Regarding The Mechanic's 
Lien. 
Although this Court specifically addressed the issue of whether the prevailing party on a 
mechanic's lien must be awarded attorney's fees (R. 814), this Court did not address the issue of 
whether an overstatement of the amount due on a mechanic's lien invalidates the lien. The law 
supported Bailey-Allen's position that the trial court should reinstate the mechanic's lien in light 
of the trial court's decision to enter judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen: 
Where the amount due under an entire contract is claimed in a lien 
notice, and the claim of full performance is erroneous, it will not, 
in the absence of a willful or intentional falsification, defeat the 
lien or the amount found actually due. 
53 Amjur 2.d Mechanic's Liens § 234, 755-756. 
This Court has sustained the validity of the mechanic's lien that contained an erroneous 
legal description in For-Shor Company v. Early, 828 P.2d 1080 (Utah App. 1992) where it 
caused no prejudice to the parties involved. Utah courts have consistently held that mechanic's 
lien statutes were enacted to protect those who enhanced the value of property by supplying labor 
or materials thereto, and should be broadly construed to effectuate that purpose. Richards v. 
Security Pacific National Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1993). See also, Graff v. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 660 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1983) (holding that "the doctrine of substantial 
compliance has validity and it has application in an appropriate case [relating to mechanic's 
liens]). See, R. 973-76. 
In light of the substantial authorities which support the trial court's power to reform its 
earlier judgment, the trial court properly refused to impose Rule 11 sanctions against Bailey-
Allen. 
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Contending that the trial court erred, the Kurzets imply far too much into the trial court's 
comments from the bench. Although the trial court agreed that Bailey-Allen should have 
appealed the mechanic's lien issue, rather than move for reinstatement of the lien after appeal, the 
trial court did not find that counsel acted in a manner inconsistent with "the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief or that counsel failed to make a reasonable inquiry or that 
there was no good-faith argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law. To the 
contrary, the reasonable inference from the trial court's decision is a factual determination that 
Bailey-Allen's counsel acted in a manner consistent with the best of his knowledge, information 
and belief, after reasonable inquiry. The trial court's factual determination is reviewed on appeal 
under the "clearly erroneous standard." Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992). 
If the trial court's comments from the bench amount to a conclusion that counsel violated 
Rule 11, then the trial court erred in so finding, for the reasons stated above. But, even then, the 
trial court's decision not to award money was within its discretion. As this court has declared, 
and as the Kurzets concede, "The Rule gives the trial court substantial latitude to tailor the 
sanctions to fit the particular facts of each case." (Appellants' Brief at 48) citing Taylor v. Estate 
of Taylor, 110 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989). Rule 11 does not require those sanctions to include 
attorney's fees. Rather, Rule 11 provides that the sanctions "may" include attorney's fees. The 
trial court may fashion its own remedy, which is reviewed on an "abuse of discretion" standard. 
Id 
The trial court used the latitude afforded in the Rule to consider the conduct of counsel on 
both sides. Over counsel's objections, the Kurzets brought their Motion for Attorney's Fees 
before Judge Iwasaki, who had not been involved and was not familiar with the facts underlying 
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the Motion for Attorney's Fees. The trial court deemed the Kurzets' maneuver to be improper. 
("I think it was improper for him [Kurzets' counsel] to bring it before [Judge Iwasaki]). (R. 
1061). Rather than complicate matters, the trial court exercised its substantial discretion and 
latitude by denying each side's allegation of improper conduct by the other. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Bailey-Allen respectfully requests that this Court affirm. 
DATED this ' b day of January, 1997. 
ALLEN NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
By: J, 
Bruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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3. Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: Spencer E. Austin and William J. Evans, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellants 
Bruce J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Ormq. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Stanley Kurzet, Anne Kurzet, ^and the Kurzet Family Trust 
appeal from a district court order awarding Bailey-Allen Company, 
Inc., damages, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest 
under a construction contract and denying the Kurzets' request 
for attorney fees on their successful summary judgment motion. 
We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
In July 1990, Stanley Kurzet and Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. 
entered into a contract for the construction of the Kurzets' 
home. The agreement, which Mr. Kurzet drafted, provides in 
relevant portion: 
uao9 
This Agreement covers all of the 
understandings existing between BAILEY-ALLEN 
(Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for 
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of 
the EVERGREEN development at DEER VALLEY, 
PARK CITY, UTAH. 
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a 
cost plus fixed fee basis. Costs shall be 
billed monthly and payment shall be made 
within ten days of receipt of billing. The 
fee fixed for this contract is set at 
$100,000 for the residence as depicted in the 
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in 
directed additional work, if any. Any 
directed additional work in excess of an 
aggregate cost of $50,000 will result in 
additional fees based on 7% of the cost of 
such additional work. 
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that 
this contract cannot be changed except and 
unless in writing, bearing the date and 
signatures of both parties. 
The Owner's review authority 
notwithstanding, the Contractor is fully 
responsible to Owner for the performance of 
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs 
occasioned by the failure of a subcontractor 
to perform shall not be assessable to Owner. 
The Contractor shall carry insurance 
specifically providing for saving Owner 
harmless from any action arising due to the 
injury of a worker even if an employ[ee] of a 
subcontractor or supplier who is not properly 
or adequately insured. Contractor shall, 
within 10 days of the date of this agreement 
furnish a Certificate of Insurance prepared 
by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The 
Certificate shall specifically state the 
purpose and limits of the policy and these 
shall show that the work to be performed 
under this contract is covered. 
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Contractor takes note that Owner is 
concerned about the quality of workmanship 
and materials and that this concern stems 
from prior experience with a local contractor 
and ownership of several condominiums at the 
Pinnacle development. Owner will not make 
unreasonable demands, however, slovenly 
workmanship and/or substandard materials will 
neither be accepted [n]or paid for by Owner. 
Owner considers that the fees he pays to 
Contractor are specifically for his expertise 
in selecting and supervising workers so as to 
avoid unacceptable and substandard 
workmanship and/or the use of substandard 
quality materials. 
The agreement is silent regarding remedies in the event of a 
breach by either party. 
Ten days after the contract was signed, Mr. Kurzet requested 
the required certificate of insurance, but never received it. 
Bailey-Allen later admitted that its policy had expired nearly 
two years earlier. In October 1990, Mr. Kurzet terminated 
Bailey-Allen's services, based on its failure to provide proof of 
insurance and Mr. Kurzet's dissatisfaction with Bailey-Allen's 
attention to the project. At the time of the termination, the 
work under the contract was approximately 10% complete, with the 
house framed and the roof partially finished. 
Bailey-Allen filed a complaint against the Kurzets in 
December 1990, alleging breach of contract, mechanics' lien, 
unjust enrichment, and failure to obtain a construction bond. 
The trial court subsequently granted the Kurzets' motion for 
partial summary judgment on the latter three causes of action, 
reserving the breach of contract c^aim for trial to the bench. 
At the trial on the breach of contract claim, the court 
reinstated sua sponte the unjust enrichment claim and granted a 
continuance for the parties to present their evidence thereupon. 
After hearing the evidence, the court determined "that the 
subject contract was ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that 
the Court has a responsibility to add to it." The court further 
concluded that Bailey-Allen's failure to provide evidence of 
insurance and its lack of supervision of the project were 
material breaches of the contract that justified the termination. 
The court determined the Kurzets had not breached the contract. 
930178-CA 3 
OSLO 
The trial court then concluded that Bailey-Allen was 
entitled to recover under its unjust enrichment theory and went 
on to consider the amount of damages due, concluding that "the 
most logical basis [was] the percentage of defendants' residence 
that was completed during the period plaintiff was on the job," 
Accordingly, the court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 "in quantum 
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff 
and defendants, $10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price 
for services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 
for services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber." 
Bailey-Allen was held liable to the Kurzets for $1800 in costs 
for repairing Bailey-Allen's faulty construction of a retaining 
wall, for $2000 for repairing its faulty construction of concrete 
steps, and for $559 in costs for unnecessary materials. 
The court entered judgment for Bailey-Allen in the amount of 
$11,141, representing its damages offset by the amounts owed to 
the Kurzets. The court awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest 
and postjudgment interest from and after April 17, 1992, the date 
the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. The court dismissed the Kurzets' 
counterclaims and denied their claim for attorney fees and costs 
associated with their successful motion for partial summary 
judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond claims. 
The Kurzets appeal, claiming the trial court erred in: (1) 
awarding Bailey-Allen damages under the contract or in quantum 
meruit; (2) awarding prejudgment interest; (3) awarding 
postjudgment interest from the date it granted Bailey-Allen's 
motion to compel findings of facts and conclusions of law, rather 
than from the date the judgment was entered; and (4) denying 
their claim for attorney fees and costs on their successful 
partial summary judgment motion under the mechanics' lien and 
construction bond statutes. 
I. DAMAGE AWARD 
The trial court awarded Bailey-Allen $15,500 in damages "in 
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between 
the parties."1 Whether the court's theory of recovery was proper 
raises a question of law, which this court reviews for 
correctness. Van Dvke v. Chappell. 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 
1. Bailey-Allen argues that the award of $10,000 was "clearly 
awarded pursuant to the construction contract [and not] under an 
^unjust enrichment' theory." However, the basis of the award is 
not as clear as Bailey-Allen suggests, particularly in light of 
the wording of the judgment. 
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1991). We are also mindful that we may affirm a trial court's 
decision on any proper ground. Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte 
Vista Ranch, Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988); accord Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc.. 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we can affirm the 
award if we find any proper basis to support it. 
A. Recovery Under the Contract 
We first look at the written contract to determine whether 
its terms justify the damage award. In evaluating the contract, 
this court must first ascertain whether the contract was 
integrated and second whether it was ambiguous. Ron Case Roofing 
& Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomcruist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989). Neither party argued that the contract was not 
integrated, and it expressly states that it was the entire 
understanding of the parties and could not be changed except in 
writing. Regarding ambiguity, however, the contract provided no 
guidance relevant to the proper remedy for breach. As such, the 
contract was ambiguous or, more accurately, silent as to the 
intent of the parties regarding remedies in case of breach. 
Furthermore, no extrinsic evidence shed light on what remedies 
the parties intended in the event of a breach. 
In the absence of any express contract provision or 
extrinsic evidence of intent, we look to a rule set forth in an 
early supreme court case for guidance in our analysis: "In an 
action upon the contract [the contractor] cannot recover unless 
and until he [or she] shows that he [or she] has, substantially 
at least, complied with its provisions." Rvan v. Curlew 
Irrigation & Reservoir Co., 36 Utah 382, 391, 104 P^  218, 221 
(1909) (emphasis added); see also Reliance Ins. v. Utah Dept. of 
Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 (Utah 1993) (discussing doctrine of 
substantial completion, but holding it inapplicable on facts of 
case). Professor Corbin states this rule as follows: lf[W]hen a 
contract has been made for an agreed exchange of two 
performances, one of which is to be^ -rendered first, the rendition 
of this one substantially in full is a constructive condition 
precedent to the duty of the other party to render his [or her] 
part of the exchange." 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 
§ 700, at 309 (1960). 
However, "[i]f the defective performance, though less than 
* substantial' has conferred benefits on the defendant in excess 
of his [or her] injury, he [or she] may be under a quasi-
contractual duty to pay that excess." Id. § 700, at 310. Thus, 
[a] contractor whose breach is such that he 
[or she] has rendered less than "substantial 
performance" has no right to the contract 
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price; he [or she] is said to have no remedy 
"on the contract" . . • . The contractor's 
right is a right to reasonable compensation 
for value received by the defendant over and 
above the injury suffered by the contractor's 
breach. 
Id. § 710, at 342. 
Applying this principle, we conclude neither the court's 
findings nor the underlying evidence establish that Bailey-Allen 
substantially performed under the contract. The court found only 
that what work was accomplished had come about regardless of 
whether Bailev-Allen performed. Furthermore, the court 
acknowledged that Bailey-Allen was "not performing" certain 
aspects of the contract, in addition to failing to obtain 
insurance. Even if we attribute to Bailey-Allen the 10% of the 
work completed during its three-month tenure, it still does not 
constitute substantial performance. Because Bailey-Allen failed 
to substantially perform as required by the contract, it cannot 
recover under the contract. 
B. Recovery in Quantum Meruit 
The Kurzets argue that the existence of a written contract 
bars an action in quantum meruit. They are correct that recovery 
in quantum meruit typically presupposes that no enforceable 
written or oral contract exists. Karaoanos v. Boardwalk Fries, 
Inc., 837 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah App.), cert, denied/ 843 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1992); accord Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 
1987). However, as explained above, there is no enforceable 
contract between Bailey-Allen and the Kurzets. Thus, recovery 
under quantum meruit may be appropriate. 
As discussed earlier, a non-breaching party is discharged 
from its contract duties but may h^ye a quasi-contractual duty to 
pay the value of the benefit conferred in excess of the damage 
caused by the contractor's breach. Corbin §§ 700, at 309-10, 
707, at 329. The Utah Supreme Court employed an analogous 
approach in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P.2d 418 
(19 61), suggesting that recovery in quantum meruit is appropriate 
to compensate a breaching contractor for pre-breach work 
performed. The court stated that while a breaching contractor 
"is not entitled to the benefits of the contract, he [or she] is, 
nevertheless, entitled to payment on a quantum meruit basis for 
the work which he [or she] did perform." Id., 12 Utah 2d at 194-
95, 364 P.2d at 421; see also Backus v. Apishapa Land & Cattle 
Co., 615 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Eckes v. Luce, 173 P. 
219, 220 (Okla. 1918). 
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Quantum meruit has two branches, both rooted in justice. 
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp.. 753 
P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The branch applicable to this 
case is a contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract 
or unjust enrichment, which is a legal action in restitution. 
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269. To prove a contract implied in law or 
unjust enrichment, the following must be shown: •• (1) the 
defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by 
the defendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would 
make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
paying for it." id.; accord Backus, 615 P.2d at 44. The benefit 
conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiff's detriment or 
the reasonable value of its services, is the measure of recovery. 
Davies. 746 P.2d at 269; accord Scheller. 753 P.2d at 975. 
The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law do 
not specifically address the three requirements for recovery 
under unjust enrichment, nor do the undisputed underlying facts 
make clear that a quasi-contract award is appropriate. Instead 
the court's findings are internally inconsistent. For example, 
the trial court concluded that Bailey-Allen conferred a $10,000 
benefit "regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties 
under the contract." The Kurzets argue persuasively that Bailey-
Allen does not satisfy the first element of the Davies test 
because Bailey-Allen conferred no benefit upon them. The trial 
court seemed to agree, at least in theory, in finding that the 
10% of the work completed during Bailey-Allen's tenure was not 
necessarily due to its presence or performance. 
It is equally unclear whether the second element of the 
Davies test was satisfied. Mr. Kurzet's testimony suggests he 
failed to realize any benefit conferred directly by Bailey-Allen. 
In fact, the core of the Kurzets' defense is that Bailey-Allen 
failed to perform any of the material terms of the contract and 
that any portion of the project completed was accomplished by 
other parties. Furthermore, the trial court found that Bailey-
Allen did not give the project the attention Mr. Kurzet demanded. 
Finally, under the third element, the trial court did not find 
explicitly that it would be unjust to allow the Kurzets to 
retain, without payment, the construction completed before 
Bailey-Allen was terminated. 
We are simply unable to determine whether the trial court's 
award of $10,000 "in quantum meruit/unjust enrichment" was 
predicated on the proper legal standard. We therefore reverse 
the award and remand for analysis and findings under the standard 
articulated in Davies. The trial court should make detailed, 
consistent findings on each of the three required elements and 
allow recovery only if all three are satisfied. 
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C. Measure of Damages 
If the trial court determines on remand that an award is 
warranted, we offer the following guidance for assessing the 
measure of damages. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
suggests a measure of damages referred to as "restitution in 
favor of party in breach." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 374 (1981) . Section 374 states that the breaching party is 
liable for the loss caused by the breach, but may recover the 
benefit conferred if it exceeds that loss. Id. The party 
seeking restitution must prove the measure of that benefit. Id. 
Therefore, if on remand the trial court determines that 
recovery under quantum meruit is appropriate, it must make 
findings on the damages caused by Bailey-Allen's breach. The 
court should also make particularized findings on any benefit 
conferred on the Kurzets by Bailey-Allen, including its 
supervision as the general contractor and its involvement in 
negotiating the purchase price of the lumber at issue. We note 
that the court should make certain that any benefit conferred in 
negotiating the price of the lumber must be somehow in addition 
to the benefits Bailey-Allen conferred by virtue of performing 
its contractual duty to supervise the project. Bailey-Allen 
should ultimately recover only the benefit conferred in excess of 
the damage it caused. We also note that the percentage of the 
work completed, if it resulted from Bailey-Alleys efforts, is 
not an unreasonable measure of the benefit conferred. See 
Darrell J. Didericksen & Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer, 613 
P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1980) (noting trial court may determine 
recovery "on the basis of the contract price, or on the 
reasonable value, of the portion of the project already completed 
and not paid for"); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
374 (1981) (deeming contract price inconclusive evidence of 
benefit conferred and stating "in no case will the party in 
breach be allowed to recover more than a ratable portion of the 
total contract price where such a portion can be determined"). 
II. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
The Kurzets next claim that the trial court improperly 
awarded Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest. Because we vacate the 
judgment, we deal with this issue only for the benefit of the 
trial court if it concludes on remand that a judgment under 
quantum meruit is proper. 
A trial court's decision on "entitlement to prejudgment 
interest presents a question of law which we review for 
correctness." Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 
171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah Supreme Court recently 
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reiterated the rule that prejudgment interest is properly awarded 
when "the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and the 
amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy 
in accordance with well-established rules of damages." Bellon v. 
Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991). The court also noted 
***+^t prejudgment interest is typically not allowed in cases of 
editable relief that ••*address themselves to the conscience and 
discretion of the trial court.'" Xsi. (quoting Fullmer v. Blood. 
546 P.za 606, 610 (Utah 1976)). 
This court has previously rejected a claim for prejudgment 
interest on an unjust enrichment award. Shoreline Dev.. Inc. v. 
Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). We noted that 
"the lack of mathematical certainty generally prevents an award 
of prejudgment interest in equity claims." Id. We conclude that 
any damages in this case cannot be fixed at a particular time and 
with accuracy. Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1225 
(Utah App. 1990). Therefore, even if recovery in quantum meruit 
is awarded on remand, no prejudgment interest should be awarded. 
III. POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST2 
The Kurzets also appeal the award of postjudgment interest 
at 12% per annum from and after April 17, 1992, the date upon 
which the trial court granted Bailey-Allen's motion to compel 
findings, conclusions, and judgment.3 They claim that 
postjudgment interest, if appropriate at all, should accrue only 
as of the date a judgment is entered. We review the award of 
postjudgment interest, a question of law, under the .correction of 
error standard. Cf. Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 848 
P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993) (applying same standard of review 
to prejudgment interest). 
2. If the trial court does not award damages on remand, then 
there will be no basis for post-judgment interest. We therefore 
offer the following guidance only in the event that damages are 
awarded. 
3. Apparently the delay in filing the findings, conclusions, and 
judgment occurred because the Kurzets obtained new counsel. As 
soon as the substitution of counsel took place, the documents 
were filed. Bailey-Allen argues that it was appropriate for the 
trial court to "penalize" the Kurzets for this delay. The 
Kurzets counter that Bailey-Allen could have sought sanctions for 
the delay and that the trial court should not have penalized them 
in this fashion for delaying the entry of the judgment. 
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Our decision in Mason v. Western Mortgage. 754 P.2d 984 
(Utah App. 1988), disposes of this issue. In Mason, this court 
held that postjudgment interest dates from the entry of a new 
judgment upon remand. Id. at 987. Moreover, we cited with 
approval a California case holding that ,n[a] judgment bears 
legal interest from the date of its entry in the trial cnnrt,MI 
Id. at 986 (quoting Stockton Theatres. Inc. v. Palermo. c^*0 P. 2d 
76, 78 (Cal. 1961)). 
Mason dictates that any postjudgment interest awarded in 
this case should run only from the date of the new judgment on 
remand. Id. at 987. We therefore reverse th* award of 
postjudgment interest from April 17, 1992 and remand for the 
entry of postjudgment interest, if damages are awarded, only from 
the date the new judgment is entered.4 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES 
Finally, the Kurzets challenge the trial court's denial of 
their request for attorney fees and costs attributable to their 
successful motion for partial summary judgment. On September 24, 
1991, the trial court granted the Kurzets' motion for partial 
summary judgment on the mechanics' lien and construction bond 
causes of action. At that time, the court "reserved for future 
determination" the request for attorney fees and costs. Although 
the Kurzets subsequently filed an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and 
Costs and requested such fees on several occasions, the trial 
court never determined the amount of fees and ultimately denied 
without explanation the request for attorney fees and costs 
attributable to the successful motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
In most cases, attorney fees are appropriately awarded only 
if authorized by statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 13JB8) . The Mechanics' Lien 
statute provides: "In any action brought to enforce any lien 
4. To avoid confusion on remand, we wish to make clear that any 
post-judgment interest should run from the date that the new 
judgment is entered, rather than orally rendered. See Utah R. 
App. P. 32; Mason, 754 P.2d at 987; see also National Steel 
Const. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 543 P.2d 642, 644-45 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (concluding entry of judgment and not oral 
ruling liquidates damages because oral ruling subject to change 
before entry); Pure Gas & Chem. Co. v. Cook, 526 P.2d 986, 993 
(Wyo. 1974) (concluding verdict is not final liquidation of sum 
due until judgment entered and awarding post-judgment interest 
from date of entry). 
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under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys/ fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-18 (1988) (emphasis added). Bailey-Allen concedes that 
section 38-1-18 applies and apparently does not dispute that this 
is an action "to enforce any lien." Id. The issuef then, is 
whether attorney fees must be awarded under the statutory scheme. 
In Rotta v. Hawk. 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988), this court 
observed that a lien foreclosure action satisfied the 
requirements of section 38-1-18. !£. at 716. Furthermore, the 
supreme court has previously ruled that the benefit of attorney 
fees under the statute is conferred upon "the successful party," 
which may include the party who defended against the lien. 
Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325, 
327-28 (1969) . Therefore the Kurzets, as the successful party, 
were entitled to attorney fees. 
We thus conclude that the trial court erred in denying the 
Kurzets' request for attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien 
statute, and we remand for a determination of the amount of 
reasonable attorney fees. For guidance in calculating that 
amount, we direct the trial court to Dixie State Bank. 764 P.2d 
at 989-90 (establishing "practical guidelines" for evaluating 
evidence of reasonable attorney fees). 
Attorney fees under the Bond Statute may also be warranted. 
The Bond Statute states: "In an action for failure to obtain a 
bond, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the 
prevailing party." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1992) (emphasis 
added). Bailey-Allen is apparently correct, then, that section 
14-2-2(3) endows the trial court with discretion in awarding 
attorney fees. We must therefore determine whether the trial 
court's denial of those fees constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross. 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 
(Utah App.), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993) (awarding 
attorney fees under contract) . Hoover, in order for this court 
to conduct a meaningful review of that determination, we must 
rely on adequate findings of fact, Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 
143, 155-56 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 
1993) , which are absent in this case. 
Consequently, the trial court's failure to set forth its 
basis for denying the requested attorney fees was an abuse of 
discretion, and we remand for the entry of findings supporting 
the decision to award or deny attorney fees under the Bond 
statute. When determining whether attorney fees should be 
awarded under the Bond Statute, the trial court should consider 
precedent treating the Bond Statute as auxiliary to the 
Mechanics' Lien Statute and as sharing with it a common purpose. 
See King Bros.. Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co.. 13 Utah 2d 339, 341, 
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374 P.2d 254, 255-56 (1962); Rio Grande Lumber v. Darke, 50 Utah 
114, 124, 167 P. 241, 245 (1917). Those cases suggest that it is 
generally appropriate to award reasonable attorney fees under the 
Bond Statute when fees are awarded under the Mechanics' Lien 
Statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Bailey-Allen was not entitled to recover damages under the 
contract. However, it may be entitled to recover in quantum 
meruit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the entry of 
findings consistent with this opinion and, if those findings 
support an award in quantum meruit, for the entry of a judgment. 
We reverse the award of prejudgment interest, and we direct the 
trial court to award postjudgment interest, if a judgment is 
awarded, only from the date the new judgment on remand is 
entered. Finally, we reverse and remand for the entry of 
attorney fees under the Mechanics' Lien Statute and for 
consideration of whether they should be awarded under the Bond 
Statute. 
Vnadith M. B i l l i n g s , 0 
Presiding Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an individual; 
STANLEY M. KURZET and ANNE L. 
KURZET, as Trustees for the Kurzet 
Family Trust; THE KURZET FAMILY 
TRUST: and JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 
[0. 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 10870 
This matter was tried to the Court on December 18 and 19, 1991 and January 30, 
1992. Having considered the evidence, testimony and exhibits produced at trial and the 
arguments of counsel, this Court previously entered its original Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment on October 6, 1992. Defendants subsequently appealed the Court's 
Findings. Conclusions and Judgment. 
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On May 24, 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision reversing this 
Court's prior decision and remanding the matter to this Court for additional consideration. 
Subsequently on January 23, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered 
Judgment in favor of Defendants in the amount of $1,937.50 for attorneys fees in connection 
with previously dismissed mechanic's lien and bonding statute causes of action. 
Pursuant to motion of the Plaintiff that this Court enter Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Amended Judgment pursuant to the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, this Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings and documents on file herein, 
including the transcript of proceedings at trial. The Court has further reconsidered its original 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision dated May 24, 1994. 
Further, on November 21, 1995, this Court also heard and considered oral argument by 
counsel for the parties on the issues relating to Plaintiffs motion to reconsider the matter. 
The Court acknowledges that through mis-communication between itself and counsel for the 
parties, the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were inadequate and the Court 
desires to clarify its findings, conclusions and decision based upon the evidence. As a result, 
the following Amended Findings of Fact and Amended Conclusions of Law 3upcr3cpe the 
original Findings and Conclusions entered by the Court prior to Defendants' appeal. 
Accordingly, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
2 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties intended to and did enter into a written contract 
("Contract") wherein Plaintiff agreed to act as the general contractor and to oversee 
construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah. The Contract called for a 
construction period of one year. 
2. The Court finds that Defendant Stanley M. Kurzet drafted the written Contract. 
3. The Court finds that the Contract between the parties provided that Plaintiff 
wrould complete construction on Defendants' residence within one year and, in return. 
Defendants would pay Plaintiff $100,000 consideration for Plaintiffs general contractor 
services in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 per hour for Plaintiffs own 
hands on labor. 
4. The Court finds that the Defendants had experienced problems with prior 
contractors on the residence and that Plaintiff was aware that Defendants had already 
terminated two earlier general contractors for unsatisfactory performance. Plaintiff was also 
aware that Stanley M. Kurzet was a meticulous antFdemanding individual and would require 
exacting performance of the Contract. 
5. The Court finds that Plaintiff thereafter commenced performing its duties under 
the Contract. Plaintiff performed some direct hands on labor to the project and was paid for 
such work by Defendants. Plaintiff also performed services related to the services of a 
3 
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general contractor. Plaintiff has received no compensation for such general contractor 
services. 
6. The Court finds that the parties also intended, and the Contract provided, for 
Plaintiff to provide Defendants with evidence of adequate liability insurance covering its work 
pursuant to the Contract. Such evidence of insurance was to have been provided by Plaintiff 
within ten (10) days of execution of the Contract. 
7. The Court finds that Plaintiff represented to Defendants that Plaintiff had one 
million dollars in liability insurance coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the 
contract on July 3, 1990, that Defendants wanted such insurance increased to four or five 
million in coverage, and that Plaintiff later discovered its policy was only for three hundred 
thousand dollars and that it had been cancelled on October 24, 1989. 
8. The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 1990 from Defendants to 
Plaintiff which was delivered to Michael Kent, Defendants notified Plaintiff that it had not yet 
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage and that Defendants required 
such evidence under the terms of the Contract. 
9. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not subsequently provide the required 
certificate of insurance to the Defendants. 
10. The Court finds that Plaintiff did not give the construction project the attention 
that Plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect or demand. 
4 
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11. The Court finds that some construction mistakes occurred during the course of 
construction, causing Defendants subsequent damage for repairs, etc. in the total amount of 
$4,359.00 and detailed as follows: 
a. the sum of $1,800 in connection with the construction of Defendants' 
east side retaining wall; 
b. the sum of $2,000 in connection with the construction of Defendants' 
west side concrete steps; and 
c. the sum of $559 in materials ordered for the job by Plaintiff but which 
were subsequently deemed to be unnecessary. 
12. The Court finds that Defendants terminated Plaintiffs services on October 2, 
1990. after three months of work on the construction project by Plaintiff; 
13. The Court finds that there is no provision in the Contract relating to the 
measure of damages in the event of default thereof by either party. 
14. The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in 
effect, Michael Kent of the Plaintiff was on the construction site approximately thirty (30) 
hours per week. In addition, Mr. Richard Allen of the Plaintiff visited the construction site, 
practically every day for some period of time^ cu V\\s OO^N T ^ s ^ ^ r ^ r ^ . 
15. The Court finds that Mr. Allen was also available on his mobile phone when 
not on site and made or received daily calls concerning the job. 
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16. The Court finds that Mr. Allen also spent considerable time at his home in the 
evening making calls, setting up appointments and contacting other contractors in connection 
with the job. 
17. The Court finds that during the three month period that the Contract was in 
effect, Plaintiff performed general contractor services, including the hiring of subcontractors, 
overseeing the work of subcontractors, getting bids on retaining walls, windows, cabinets and 
other items, meeting with people, including building inspectors, and generally coordinating the 
work on the job. 
18. The Court finds that during the time Plaintiff was the general contractor of the 
project, the residence progressed from a concrete slab to a point where the roof was read) to 
be completed on the multi-story residence. Based upon the testimony of Defendants' expert 
witness, the Court finds that 10% of the construction project contemplated by the Contract 
was completed during the time Plaintiff was general contractor. 
19. The Court finds that Defendant Stanley Kurzet was regularly on the job site, 
often as much as six (6) hours a day. He persona^observed the progress on the home. As 
a result, Defendants were aware of the progress of the home while Plaintiff was the general 
contractor and was aware of the benefit Defendants received as a result of Plaintiff s services. 
20. The Court finds that at no time during the three month period in which the 
Contract was in effect did Defendants express any dissatisfaction with the work or progress on 
the job. On at least one occasion Stanley Kurzet expressed to Plaintiff that he was satisfied 
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with the way the work was going. Defendants did not attempt to stop Plaintiff from 
completing the Contract until Defendant Stanley Kurzet terminated the same in connection the 
insurance matter. 
21. The Court finds that Defendant Kurzet acknowledged at trial that Plaintiff was 
the general contractor on the job during the time in which the work was completed which was 
the subject of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
22. The Court finds that after commencing its duties under the Contract, Plaintiff 
also inventoried and hand counted all lumber at the site which had been ordered by a prior 
contractor. Plaintiff thereafter engaged in successful negotiations and settlement of a dispute 
with the vendor of such lumber over the amount owing thereon. 
23. The Court finds that Defendants received a benefit of $5,500 through Plaintiffs 
settlement of the dispute over the amount owed on the prior lumber order. Defendants were 
aware of Plaintiffs involvement in such matter and were aware of the $5,500 savings which 
they thereby received. 
From the foregoing Amended Findings of-F3et, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the parties entered into a valid and binding Contract 
on July 3, 1990 for the construction of Defendants' residence in Park City, Utah. Under the 
terms thereof. Plaintiff was obligated to perform certain services and duties as general 
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contractor of the construction and Defendants were similarly obligated to pay Plaintiff for 
services rendered under the Contract. 
2. The Court concludes that given that amount of the Contract and the cost of the 
construction, Plaintiff had a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for the 
project, but did not do so. 
3. The Court concludes that Defendants were justified in terminating Plaintiffs 
services under the Contract as a result of Plaintiffs breach of its obligation to promptly 
provide evidence of adequate liability insurance. 
4. The Court concludes that Defendants were not in breach of the Contract in any 
way at the time Plaintiff was terminated as general contractor for the project. 
5. The Court finds that prior to Plaintiffs termination as general contractor, it had 
not substantially completed their duties under the Contract. As a result, Plaintiff is not 
entitled to recover under the Contract. 
6. The Court concludes that the parties intended under the Contract that Plaintiff 
would be responsible for the actions of subcontracted on the job and responsible to 
Defendants for any mistakes made by such subcontractors. Conversely, the Court concludes 
that the parties also intended that Plaintiff should also be attributed with the benefits of any 
cumulative work done by subcontractors on the project. 
7. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs services as general contractor conferred a 
benefit to the Defendants. 
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8. The Court concludes that the Defendants were aware of the benefit conferred as 
a result of Plaintiffs general contractor services through its actual on-site observation and 
satisfaction of the work performed. 
9. The Court concludes that under the circumstances, it would be unjust for the 
Defendants to retain the benefit received without payment for the same. 
10. The Court concludes that on the basis of contract implied in law, quasi-contract 
or unjust enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants the value of the 
benefit conferred upon Defendants, less any damages resulting from Plaintiffs breach of the 
Contract. 
11. The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that it had earned and should receive 
one-fourth, or $25,000, of the $100,000 fee because it had spent three months on the job, or 
one quarter of the one year period for construction contemplated under the Contract. The 
Court finds that such a position is unreasonable and unsupported by the facts. 
12. The Court concludes that the proper and appropriate measure of the benefit 
conferred upon Defendants is the pro-rata portion-e£the fee previously agreed in the Contract. 
Based upon the testimony of Defendants expert witness, one-tenth of construction 
contemplated by the Contract was completed and as a result, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon 
Defendants in the amount of $10,000. 
13. The Court concludes that the Defendants suffered no damage as a result of 
Plaintiffs failure to supply the required proof of insurance. As a result, no reduction to 
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Plaintiffs recovery should be made in Defendants' favor for such element of the breach of 
Contract. 
14. The Court concludes that Defendants did suffer damage resulting from 
construction mistakes made while Plaintiff was the general contractor. The damage resulting 
from such construction mistakes is the amount of $4,359, which amount should be deducted 
from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. 
15. On January 21, 1995, Judge Glenn Iwasaki of this Court entered Judgment in 
favor of Defendants relating to attorneys fees incurred in the prior dismissal of the mechanic's 
lien and bonding statute claims. The current balance of such Judgment is $2,170 and such 
amount should also be deducted from any amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. As a 
result, such prior Judgment should be deemed satisfied. 
16. Except as set forth above, Defendants suffered no additional damage resulting 
from Plaintiffs breach of the Contract and there are no other deductions applicable to 
amounts otherwise owing to the Plaintiff. 
17. Negotiation of the disputed lumber-feftl left over from prior contractor was not 
within the scope of the Contract. 
18. The Court concludes that with respect to the inventorying and negotiation of a 
settlement on the disputed prior lumber bill, Plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the Defendants 
in the amount of $5,500, which benefit is in addition to the benefit conferred by Plaintiffs' 
completion of ten percent of the construction. The Court concludes that Defendants were 
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aware of Plaintiffs actions with respect thereto and that it would be unjust to allow 
Defendants to retain such benefit without payment of a reasonable fee to Plaintiff for such 
benefit. Accordingly, the Court finds that a fee of one-half the savings on the lumber bill, or 
$2,750, is fair and reasonable under the circumstances. The Court finds this result particularly 
fair and reasonable inasmuch as the Court has deducted from Plaintiffs recovery the cost of 
extra materials Plaintiff ordered for the job which were ultimately found to be unnecessary. 
19. Plaintiff should also be entitled to post-judgment interest as allowed by law 
from and after the entry of Judgment. No pre-judgment interest is appropriate under Utah 
law. 
20. Plaintiff should also be entitled to its costs of court incurred in prosecuting this 
action in the amount of $542.40. 
DATED this //_ day of /^t*~~<-— , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ ^ 2 , 
Horner^ Wilkinson 
Third District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this XI day of April, 1996, I caused to be hand delivered 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following: 
Spencer E. Austin, Esq. 
William J. Evans, Esq. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
bjn^ajiev iTcl pie 
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, jvhich may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
